In this first study to test formally the market value of investor relations (IR) activity, we employ the annual US Investor Relations Magazine Investor Relations Awards from 2000 to 2002 to proxy for the quality of firm investor relations. We find firms perceived to have the most effective IR strategies earn superior abnormal returns, both before and after the nominations. This shows that while the nominations themselves may be influenced by past performance to some extent, they are nonetheless also associated with subsequent positive abnormal returns. We also find that not surprisingly, higher analyst following is associated with more nominations suggesting analysts tend to favour the stocks they follow. Consistent with effective IR leading to lower information risk, liquidity of nominated firms increases, and their cost of equity reduces significantly in the year subsequent to the nominations.
Introduction
Well functioning capital markets require a free flow of relevant information to enable efficient asset pricing. The investor relations (IR) industry has developed substantially over the past few decades, primarily driven by a growing demand for firms to provide a higher degree of information transparency and accountability to multiple stakeholders. The National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) defines IR as "A corporate marketing activity, combining the disciplines of communications and finance, providing current and potential investors with an accurate portrayal of a firm's performance and prospects, therefore having a positive effect on total value relative to the overall market and the firm's cost of capital." However, despite the substantial increase in importance firms now place on IR activities, until recently, little attention was paid in the literature as to whether an effective IR strategy adds to shareholder value. This is the first study in the literature, as far as we are aware, to seek to test formally whether effective investor relations (IR) increases firm market value.
Specifically, we address this issue by working with firms perceived to have most effective IR strategies as they are nominated by security analysts and fund managers for "Best Overall IR" in the annual US Investor Relations Magazine IR Awards for 2000 to 2002. We explore the relation between the firms" rankings in the IR awards and their stock returns, liquidity, analyst coverage, and cost of equity surrounding the date of their nomination for these key IR industry awards.
We show that in the year prior to being nominated for "Best Overall IR" in the IR Magazine awards firms earn significant abnormal stock returns, and firms with more award nominations have higher analyst coverage. These findings suggest that analysts and fund managers may be influenced to nominate firms with high prior stock returns, and firms with which they are more familiar as evidenced by higher analyst following. This supports the behavioural finance literature, which predicts these firm characteristics will appeal to the psychological preferences and biases of the respondents to the IR survey, and can influence which firms they nominate (representativeness bias). The results are consistent with similar empirical findings of prior characteristics of firms that are rated in Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) surveys (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993) .
Over the year following the IR awards, we find that nominated firms earn superior abnormal returns suggesting the market does not fully impound the implications of better IR.
Our results are consistent with the literature that finds superior abnormal returns for highly rated companies in Fortune"s "America"s Most Admired Companies" survey (Filbeck et al., 1997; Filbeck and Preece, 2003; Antunovich et al., 2000; Anderson and Smith, 2006) .
Consistent with the predictions of information risk and agency theories, which together
propose that enhanced corporate communications will reduce information risk or agency problems caused by high information asymmetry, we find that nominated firms experience an increase in stock liquidity, and a lower cost of equity capital.
A seminal paper by Brennan and Tamaronski (2000) demonstrates a chain of relationships that together establish a putative "direct link between a firm's investor relations policy and its stock price". The first link in this chain is an increase in analyst following that can result from a good corporate IR strategy that operates primarily by reducing analysts" research costs (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Francis et al., 1997; Holland, 1998) . Secondly, there is empirical support that higher analyst coverage has a significant positive impact on liquidity, both directly due to reduced trading costs, and also indirectly through a consequent effect on equity trading volumes (Brennan and Subrahmanyan, 1996) . Finally, Amihud et al. (1997) find that increased stock liquidity is a direct determinant of a firm"s cost of capital and therefore directly impacts stock prices, thus completing the final link in a putative chain of causation from effective IR to shareholder value. However, there is limited empirical evidence of a direct link between a firm"s disclosure policy and market pricing. Botosan (1997) constructs a subjective disclosure quality index based on annual report disclosures, which are treated implicitly as a proxy for the effectiveness of the firm"s overall communication policy. She finds a direct negative relationship between firms" disclosure index score and their cost of equity, but only for firms with low analyst coverage. However, the findings may not be generalizable since the study is based on a small sample of firms in a single industry sector in 1991. Crucially though, the role of IR is much more than just the mechanics of conveying formal financial information, hence Botosan"s findings make only a tangential direct contribution to the IR literature (see Marcus and Wallace, 1997) . Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) test the stock performance of the 97 firms with 3-year consecutive increases in AIMR disclosure ratings in the 1990s and find that on average these firms" stocks earned excess risk-adjusted returns of approximately 5% over this period.
Their sample consists only of firms with a sustained improvement in overall AIMR disclosure rating and is thus not representative of a typical listed firm. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) use the AIMR survey of corporate communications ratings from 1986-1996 based on a survey of analysts and fund managers. They find no significant relationship between the firms" IR ratings and their cost of equity capital. However, both Healy et al. (1999) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) use composite AIMR ratings which do not provide a "pure" measure of the value of a firm"s IR activities, since a firm"s IR performance receives only a maximum of 30% weighting in these ratings. Their results can thus only at best be a reflection of a relationship associated with a firm"s market communications more generally defined.
Finally, Bushee and Miller (2005) test 184 small and mid-cap firms that initiate IR programs between 1999 and 2004 by hiring professional IR agencies. They find that these companies significantly increase their level of disclosure and press coverage, stock trading activity, institutional ownership, analyst following, and market valuations after hiring a new IR agency. They suggest that IR activities play a significant role in helping small and mid-cap companies to overcome their low visibility because they do not generally trade on a major exchange, to attract a wider following by investors and information intermediaries and to improve their market valuation. Our study is different to Bushee and Miller (2005) because the sample firms are likely to have more established IR programs because they are nominated for IR industry awards.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents our hypotheses, data and method, section 3 presents our results, and section 4 summarises our findings.
Hypotheses, Data and Method

Hypotheses
The IR function of a firm is a dedicated channel of information from senior management to external stakeholders, hence IR performance, in theory should have significant impact on information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Effective IR should reduce the risk premium associated with information asymmetry and thereby lead to lower cost of equity. It should also lower the cost of analysts" information gathering for, and raise profile with investors thereby creating higher demand for analyst coverage of firms with better IR. Higher analyst coverage combined with lower information asymmetry should increase trading volumes and liquidity leading to lower liquidity premium and therefore, lower cost of equity and higher stock returns. Information risk theory and agency theory thus together provide a framework in which an effective IR policy can influence both stock prices and stock liquidity by reducing risks associated with high information asymmetry. Effective IR thus should reduce the perceived risks that investors associate with high information asymmetry and leads to higher stock valuations. McGuire et al. (1990) find historical financial performance of companies drives ratings in Fortune"s annual survey of "America"s Most Admired Companies". Similarly, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that firms with superior past performance and higher analyst following are more likely to receive a higher rating in the AIMR surveys. We therefore establish our first two null hypotheses: Effective IR is also associated with increased analyst coverage, primarily because it reduces the time and costs for analysts in searching for and analysing information about a firm and because it reduces information asymmetry between the firm and investors and analysts, leading to increased demand for analysts" services. We therefore establish our fourth null hypothesis: Information risk and agency theories together predict that effective IR will reduce perceived risks that investors associate with high information asymmetry with firms in which they have invested, and lower information asymmetry will lead to increased liquidity. We thus establish our fifth null hypothesis: Finally, reduced information asymmetries and improved liquidity will reduce the risk premium demanded by investors, and hence reduce the cost of equity capital for a firm. We therefore establish our sixth and final null hypothesis:
There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future reduced cost of equity capital.
Data
For over a decade, IR Magazine has annually commissioned an independent research firm to obtain nominations from investors and analyst for firms that have performed the "best" in 
Method
Each year from 2000 to 2002, firms nominated in the "large firms" category are sorted by the number of nominations received and divided into three portfolios formed at the rank percentage breakpoints of award nominations, portfolio 1 with firms in the bottom 33%, portfolio 2 with firms in the middle 34%, and portfolio 3 with firms in the top 33% by nominations received. Similarly, firms that are nominated in the "small firms" category are also sorted into three portfolios. Finally, we form three pooled portfolios, portfolio 1 is formed by pooling together portfolio 1 firms from large and small categories, and portfolios 2 and 3 are formed by pooling together portfolio 2 and 3 firms respectively from large and small categories. Panel B of table 1 presents the number of firms in each portfolio, pooled across the three award years.
1
To test whether the firms nominated for IR awards earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns, we employ the following Carhart (1997) four factor model:
where R Pt = the average of the returns of the firms in portfolio P during month t, 1 Since the portfolios are formed using percentiles of votes, the number of stocks in the portfolios is not equal.
R Ft = the risk free rate (US long bond rate) at the start of month t, RMRF t = excess return on the market factor in month t, SMB t = return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, HML t = return on the mimicking portfolio for the book-to-market factor in month t, and MOM t = return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t.
RMRF, SMB, HML and MOM factors are from the Kenneth French web site 2 .
To test the average level of analyst coverage of the firms over one year prior (T-1) and one year subsequent (T+1) to the nomination year (T), we pool our sample firms across award years and run the following regression which controls for firm market value at each year-end:
Where AF i = number of analysts publishing forecasts in I/B/E/S FirstCall database for firm i, IR i = IR rating of firm i, and MV i = market value of firm i at 31 March.
To test whether the firms" equity trading volumes increase after the nominations, we follow the methodologies employed by Amihud et al. (1997) . Our first model measures relative equity trading volume (RV), which measures liquidity in terms of firm monthly trading volumes as a percentage of "normal" equity trading volumes, which are determined by the trading volumes of the average firm in the same industry sector index, as set out below:
where V it = average equity trading volumes of stock of firm i during month t, V mt = total equity trading volumes of stock in firm i"s industry sector during month t, and N mt = number of firms listed in firm i"s industry sector during month t.
The change in relative volume (DRV) is calculated as follows:
The liquidity ratio (LR) statistic is used to measure the trading volume of a stock associated with a unit change in the stock price on the basis that stock liquidity can be defined as "The ease with which the market can absorb volume buying or selling, without a dramatic fluctuation in price" (Amihud et al., 1997) . A rise in LR implies greater market "depth", because it shows the "price-elasticity" of a stock to a change in stock trading volume, or alternatively the "volume elasticity" of a stock to a change in its price. If the LR ratio increases, any factors affecting stock price have a higher impact on the volume of trade and on liquidity. LR is defined as follows:
where V it = equity trading volume of stock of firm i during month t, and R it = buy-and-hold return on stock of firm i in month t.
The summation (Σ) is performed over 12 months prior to the nomination and 12 months after the nomination.
Finally, the change in liquidity ratio (DLR) is calculated as:
To test for the relation between change in equity trading volume and the IR rating, and change in liquidity ratio and IR rating, controlling for firm size, we estimate the following regressions:
To test the relation between cost of equity and IR, following Botosan and Plumlee (2005), we estimate the ex-ante cost of equity capital using a version of the Finite Horizon
Gordon Dividend Growth Model (Gordon and Gordon, 1997) . The model derives the internal rate of return from equating the current share price with sum of all the future discounted dividends and share price expected at that time. Because the IR nominations relate to 12-month periods ending 31st March, the cost of capital is estimated by equating the actual share price on 31st March in each base year to the sum of the discounted consensus forecasted dividends over the following 4 years and the consensus forecast of the share price at the end of the 4 years using the following model: 
Results
Equity returns
Table 2, shows that over the year immediately prior to the IR awards, firms nominated for the awards earn significantly positive abnormal returns, and the superior performance is present across both, large and small firms as well as across all IR portfolios. The evidence rejects null hypothesis H1 0 that nominated firms do not earn superior returns in the past and suggests that prior superior financial performance may drive nominations for the IR awards. Table 2 here Table 2 panel C shows that the sample firms earn 79 basis points per month abnormal returns post nomination, which is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.87), and both, large firms (panel A) and small firms (panel B) outperform significantly (71bp and 88bp per month respectively). The evidence rejects null hypothesis H30 that the nominated firms do not earn superior returns post nomination. The abnormal return over the next 12 months after the nomination is lower than that for the previous 12 months for all the portfolios and shows that the market does not fully incorporate the implications of better IR strategies, and is thus inefficient with respect to this information. Table 3 
Analyst Coverage
Table 3 here
Results in table 3 show that for both large and small firms, there is a striking and almost monotonic positive relationship between analyst coverage and effective IR (measured by the firms" number of IR award nominations), and that the firms that subsequently receive more IR award nominations had higher levels of analyst coverage in years preceding the awards and also over the following years compared to firms that are nominated by fewer IR award survey respondents. However, the relation between IR rating and analyst following can be confounded by firms size.
Regression results in Table 4 Table 5 panel A shows that for large firms, there is a monotonic increase in relative trading volumes with increase in the number of nominations. It also shows that the change in relative volumes is also highest for firms with highest number of nominations (portfolio 3), and the increase is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Equity Trading Volumes
Relative equity trading volumes (RV)
As expected, the relative volumes in panel B are much lower than in panel A due to the smaller size of these firms. The pattern in panel B is identical to that in panel A, RVs increase with number of nominations and the increase in RVs is also the highest for portfolio 3. The results indicate that liquidity levels of the firms rise in general and also that the increase in liquidity is positively associated with the effectiveness of the firms" IR.
Table 5 here
However, the relation in table 5 could also be driven by firm size since firms in portfolio 3 are larger than those in portfolio 1. To control for the effect of size, we conduct the regression in equation (7) and the results are presented in table 6. Table 6 here Table 6 clearly shows that controlling for size, there is a strong positive association between the number of nominations received and change in relative volumes, and this relation is strong for both large and small firms. This provides evidence against null hypothesis H5 0 , relative trading volumes increase for nominated firms, and the increase is higher for firms that receive more nominations. The results are consistent with increased liquidity for nominated firms as costs associated with information asymmetry fall for firms with better communications strategy as proxied by their IR award nominations. Table 7 panel A shows that liquidity ratio for firms with more nominations (portfolio 3) is much higher than that for other firms, and that there is a large and significant improvement in the liquidity ratio across all portfolios. Panel B shows similar results for small firms.
Liquidity ratio (LR)
Table 7 here
The results of the regression analysis, which additionally controls for firm size, are in Table 8 and show that change in liquidity ratio is significantly positively related to the number of IR award nominations for both, large and small firms. The evidence again rejects null hypothesis H5 0 , and supports lower information asymmetry hypothesis: nominated firms experience improved liquidity ratios, and the improvement is higher for firms judged to have more effective IR. Table 8 here Table 9 panel A shows that across all the large firms the average cost of capital falls in total by 5.2%, from an average of 11.5% in T-1 to 6.3% in T+1. The average cost of equity for the small firms (panel B) is slightly higher than for the large firms in all periods except T-1, and declines over consecutive periods T-1 to T+1, from 10.8% to 8.7% (by 2.1% in total).
Cost of Equity Capital
The cost of equity for the combined sample of large and small firms also falls consistently over periods T-1 to T+1 from 11.1% to 7.9% (panel C).
Table 9 here
The table also shows that the average cost of capital for all portfolios formed by number of nominations falls over consecutive periods. Portfolio 3 (highest number of nominations)
consistently has the lowest cost of capital. However, theory and prior literature suggest larger and less risky firms have a lower cost of equity capital, hence we need to control for these factor.
The results in Table 10 Panel C shows the only significant results for the combined sample of large and small firms are during period T-1 when there is a positive relationship between IR rating and cost of capital (t= 2.63). This implies that the firms that received most nominations at the end of period T had a higher cost of capital compared to those then less often nominated in T-1.
Although the sign reverses over the following periods T to T+1, the coefficients are not statistically significant (t = -1.24 and -1.36 respectively).
Table 10 here
Overall, these findings provide evidence against null hypothesis H6 0 , and indicate that more effective IR is associated with a reduced cost of equity.
Conclusions and summary
This study uses firms nominated for "Best Overall IR" by IR Magazine, over the period 2000 to 2002. We find that nominated firms have higher abnormal stock returns over the year immediately preceding the nominations, and that firms with higher number of nominations have higher past abnormal returns suggesting past performance drives the nominations.
However, we also find that this outperformance continues over the subsequent year, though it is much smaller, suggesting that the market is unable to price this information efficiently.
We do not find any evidence that effective IR increases analyst coverage by reducing the time and costs of analysing information for analysts and increased demand for analysts" services from investors. However, consistent with behavioural finance theories that suggest effective IR can enhance the "availability" of a stock and cause decision makers, such as security analysts, to favour a firm, we find firms that receive nominations tend to have higher analyst following.
Consistent with information risk and agency theories that predict reduced perceived information risks due to effective IR leading to lower transaction costs on the basis that trading volumes increase, and "agency costs" for stockholders, we find a significant increase in liquidity of the nominated firms, both in terms of trading volumes and in terms of liquidity ratios In summary, we find firms nominated for IR awards which proxies for effective IR strategies have higher market values. We conclude that, consistent with information and agency cost theories, effective IR has clear market impact. We believe this is the first study in the literature to have demonstrated this. Panel B shows number of firms in the portfolios based on IR score percentile. Portfolio 1 has firms with the lowest 33% of the scores, portfolio 3 has firms with highest 33% of the scores and portfolio 2 has the rest of the firms. Portfolios are then pooled across the three years. Portfolio 1 in panel C is formed by pooling portfolio 1 firms from panels A and B Similarly, portfolios 2 and 3 are formed by pooling portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 firms respectively from panels A and B.
The following regression is carried out for each portfolio: R Pt -R Ft = a + b (RMRF t ) + s SMB t + h HML t + w WML t + e t .
Where R Pt is the equally-weighted return on portfolio P in month t, R Ft is the 1-month Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t, RMRF t is the return on the market factor in month t, SMB t is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, HML t is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t and WML the return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t. Previous 12-months refer to monthly returns from March of year t-1 to February of the award year t, and next 12-months refer to monthly returns from April of award year t to March of the year t+1. Stocks that are delisted during the holding period are assumed to earn portfolio returns for the rest of the period. where AF i is the number of analysts publishing forecasts in I/B/E/S FirstCall database for firm i in year t, and MV i is the market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in year the year of nomination (T), IR i is the IR rating of firm i.
Previous 12 months Next 12 months
T-1 T T+1
Coeff. Portfolio 1 in panel C is formed by pooling portfolio 1 firms from panels A and B Similarly, portfolios 2 and 3 are formed by pooling portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 firms respectively from panels A and B.
The table shows the average monthly relative volumes during the year prior to the award nomination (T-1) and the year after the award nomination (T). Relative Volume (RV) measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average traded volume of firms in the same 2-digit industry sector in the same month. DRV is the difference between RV in the following year and RV during the previous year.
RV T where DRV is the difference between relative volume (RV) for the year after the award nomination and the RV for the year before the award nomination. RV is the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average traded volume of firms in the same 2-digit industry sector over in the same month. MV i is the market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in year the year of nomination (T), and IR i is the IR rating of firm i. Portfolio 1 in panel C is formed by pooling portfolio 1 firms from panels A and B Similarly, portfolios 2 and 3 are formed by pooling portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 firms respectively from panels A and B.
Large firms
The table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios (LR) during the year before the awards (T-1) and the year after the award (T). LR is computed as:
Where, V it is the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t, and R it is the return on stock of firm i in month t.
DLR is the percentage change in LR over periods T-1 to T. Where, DLR i is the change in liquidity ratio for firm i from the year prior to the award to the year after the award, IR i is the IR rating of firm i, and MV i is the market value of equity of firm i at 31 March of year of award. portfolios based on their IR score percentile. Portfolio 1 has firms with the lowest 33% of the scores, portfolio 3 has firms with highest 33% of the scores and portfolio 2 has the rest of the firms. Portfolios in panel B are formed as in panel A but using all companies nominated for "Best IR by a small firm" by the Investor Relations Magazine.
Portfolio 1 in panel C is formed by pooling portfolio 1 firms from panels A and B Similarly, portfolios 2 and 3 are formed by pooling portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 firms respectively from panels A and B.
The table shows where r i is estimated expected cost of equity capital for firm i, P i is the share price of firm i, E is the expectations operator. 
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